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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this petition for review pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-8-l(8)(a) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
By filing applications for hearing with the Commission' within six years from the 
date of his accidents, did Mr. Burgess satisfy the statute of limitations found in §98(2) of 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"),2 thereby enabling Mr. Burgess to 
invoke the Commission's continuing jurisdiction pursuant to §78 of the Act. 
Because this issue is one of law, the Court will review the Commission's decision 
under a "correctness" standard of review. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(d); Brown & 
Root v. Industrial Commission. 328 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (SC, 10/14/97). 
i 
Prior the July 1,1997, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 35, Chapter One, Utah Code 
Ann., was administered by The Industrial Commission of Utah. On July 1, 1997, pursuant to 
Laws of Utah, 1997, Ch. 375, §53, et seq., the Act was recodified as Title 34A, Chapter Two and 
the newly created Utah Labor Commission succeeded to the former Industrial Commission's 
authority under the Act. For purposes of simplicity, this brief refers to the Industrial Commission 
and its successor, the Labor Commission, as "the Commission." 
2 
As noted in footnote 1, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act was recodified on July 1, 1997. As 
a result of recodification, §35-1-98 (statute of limitations) was renumbered as §34A-2-417. 
Likewise, §35-1-78 (continuing jurisdiction) was renumbered as §34A-2-420. No substantive 
changes were made to either provision. The Commission's original decision and the WCF's brief 
both cite to the Act prior to recodification. For consistency, the Commission also cites to the Act 
as enacted prior to recodification. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98(2): 
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits. 
temporary partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits' 
or permanent total disability benefits is barred, unless an application for 
hearing is filed with the Division of Adjudication within six years after the 
date of the accident. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78: 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing. The Commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to 
time modify or change its former findings and orders." 
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten 
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a 
claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the 
discretion of the commission. 
(4)(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the 
statutes of limitations contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 
2. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation 
referred to in Subsection (4)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This matter arises from Mr. Burgess' two separate applications for disability 
compensation and medical benefits under the Act. (See Burgess' applications -for 
hearing; record at pages 1 & 2, 10 & 11.) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION: 
On March 25, 1996, Mr. Burgess filed an application for hearing with the 
Commission for medical expenses, temporary total disability compensation and 
2 
permanent partial disability compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of 
his employment for Siaperas Sand & Gravel on July 1, 1990. (R. 1, 2) 
Also on March 25, 1996, Mr. Burgess filed a second application for hearing with 
the Commission, seeking medical expenses, temporary total disability compensation and 
permanent partial disability compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of 
his employment for JWR, Inc. on August 18, 1994. (R. 10, 11) 
At the times of Mr. Burgess' accidents at Siaperas Sand & Gravel and JWR, Inc., 
both companies carried workers' compensation insurance with the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah ("WCF" hereafter). 
On August 28, 1996, at a hearing on Mr. Burgess' applications, Mr. Burgess and 
the WCF advised the ALJ that Mr. Burgess' accrued claims for temporary total disability 
compensation, permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses had been 
settled. (R. 291, 292) However, Mr. Burgess then moved to amend his applications to 
add claims for future potential benefits. (R. 182) 
The ALJ granted Mr. Burgess' motion to amend his applications, then dismissed 
the amended application without prejudice on the grounds the applications were not ripe 
for adjudication. (R. 293, 294; the ALJ's decision is attached as Appendix 1). 
Mr. Burgess and the WCF both filed timely motions for review of the ALJ's 
decision with the Commission. The WCF argued that the ALJ had erred in permitting 
Mr. Burgess to amend his applications. (R. 297-303) Mr. Burgess argued that the ALJ 
had erred in dismissing the amended applications. (R. 311-315) 
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The Commission responded to both motions for review in a single decision. With 
respect to the WCF's argument, the Commission concluded that even if it was error for 
the ALJ to allow Mr. Burgess to amend his applications, any such error had been 
rendered moot by the ALJ's subsequent dismissal of the amended applications. As to Mr. 
Burgess' motion for review, the Commission concluded that the ALJ's dismissal of his 
applications for workers' compensation benefits would not prevent him from seeking 
such benefits in the future, pursuant to the Commission's continuing jurisdiction. (R. 
347-351; the Commission's decision is attached as Appendix 2.) 
The WCF then filed with this Court a timely petition for review of the 
Commission's determination regarding its continuing jurisdiction over Mr. Burgess' 
claims. (R. 357-358) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
On July 1, 1990, while working at Siaperas Sand & Gravel, Mr. Burgess lost his 
footing, slid 20 feet down a coal chute and fell through planks that covered the bottom 
of the chute. He suffered "myofascial low back pain secondary to a lumbar strain." CR. 
29) 
On August 18, 1994, while working at JWR, Inc., Mr. Burgess exacerbated the 
back injury he had originally suffered at Siaperas Sand & Gravel. (R. 32) 
The WCF, the insurance carrier for both Siaperas Sand & Gravel and JWR, Inc., 
accepted liability for Mr. Burgess' accidents and paid temporary total disability 
compensation, as well as medical expenses. (R. 29 and 32) No dispute currently exists 
regarding Mr. Burgess' right to compensation for past periods of disability. (R. 291) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 78 of the Act gives the Commission continuing jurisdiction over workers' 
compensation cases. In Mr. Burgess' cases, the Commission has concluded that it may 
exercise continuing jurisdiction in the future if Mr. Burgess experiences a substantial 
change in the condition of his work-related injury. 
The Commission recognizes that its power of continuing jurisdiction is subject to 
the specific restriction of §78(4), which prohibits the Commission from exercising 
continuing jurisdiction over claims unless an application for hearing has been filed within 
the Act's statutes of limitations. With respect to Mr. Burgess, the applicable statute of 
limitations is found in §98(2) and required him to file an application within six years of 
his accidents. He did so. Consequently, §98(2)'s statute of limitations does not bar the 
Commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction in this case. 
In attacking the Commission's decision, the WCF would have this Court "imply" 
an additional restriction on the Commission's continuing jurisdiction, namely, that the 
Commission must exercise its continuing jurisdiction within six years of the workers 
accident. No such restriction exists in the plain language of §78, of §98(2), or any other 
provision of the Act. If the Court were to accept the WCF's argument and insert such a 
restriction into the Act, the Court would violate long-standing principles that the Act must 
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be liberally construed in favor of coverage, to accomplish its purpose of aiding injured 
workers. 
Finally, the WCF's reliance on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in United States 
Smelting v.Nielsen, 430 P.2d 162 (Utah 1967), is misplaced. U.S. Smelting holds that 
the Commission's continuing jurisdiction is subject to the Act's substantive limits on the 
amount and duration of workers' compensation benefits. The Commission's decision 
does not excuse Mr. Burgess from the substantive limits of the Act. Consequently, the 
decision in U.S. Smelting is not controlling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: MR. BURGESS SATISFIED §98(2)'S STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS BY FILING AN APPLICATIONS FOR HEARING 
WITHIN SIX YEARS OF HIS ACCIDENT. 
Section 98(2), the Act's statute of limitations for disability compensation, is plain 
and simple: "A claim for compensation . . . is barred, unless an application for hearing 
is filed . . . within six years after the date of the accident." 
The Commission recognizes that injured workers seeking disability compensation 
must satisfy the filing requirement of §98(2) of the Act. The Commission also recognizes 
it has no authority to modify the requirements of §98(2). But just as the Commission 
cannot excuse injured workers from §98(2)'s filing deadline, neither can the Commission 
impose more stringent conditions than those set forth in the statute's plain language. 
In this case, Mr. Burgess filed applications for hearing within the six year 
limitation of §98(2). It is true that the applications, as originally filed, requested 
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temporary and partial disability compensation, but not permanent total disability 
compensation. That fact is irrelevant, however, to the question of whether Mr. Burgess 
has satisfied §98(2). The only requirement imposed by §98(2) is that an injured worker 
file "arf application for hearing. Consequently, when Mr. Burgess filed his timely 
applications for hearing, he satisfied the requirement of §98(2), and the Commission 
obtained jurisdiction over his cases. 
POINT TWO: AFTER THE COMMISSION OBTAINED INITIAL 
JURISDICTION OVER MR. BURGESS CASES, §78 OF THE ACT 
GRANTED THE COMMISSION CONTINUING JURISDICTION 
TO CONSIDER THE CASES IN THE FUTURE, UNDER 
APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The Commission's continuing jurisdiction over workers' compensation cases 
derives from §78(1) of the Act: 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing. The Commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to 
time modify or change its former findings and orders. 
However, the Commission's continuing jurisdiction over workers' compensation cases 
is limited in several respects. 
First, the Commission must obtain initial jurisdiction over a case as a prerequisite 
to any continuing jurisdiction. The Commission does not obtain initial jurisdiction until 
an injured worker has filed a timely application for hearing. In this case, the Commission 
obtained jurisdiction on March 25, 1996, when Mr. Burgess filed his two applications for 
hearings. 
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Second, even after the Commission has obtained initial jurisdiction, the 
Commission may not exercise continuing jurisdiction without "evidence of some 
significant change or new development in the claimant's injury or proof of the previous 
award's inadequacy." Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 733 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1987). 
Third, in those cases where the Commission exercises continuing jurisdiction, the 
applicant continues to bear the evidentiary burden of proving his or her claim. As noted 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund. 889 P.2d 409, 
412 (Utah 1994), the applicant must still "overcome the substantial issues of causation 
that exist." Furthermore, the injured worker's claim remains subject to all the Act's 
substantive restrictions on benefits, such as the maximum amount of benefits that may be 
paid, or the time period over which benefits may be paid. United States Smelting v. 
Nielsen. 430 P.2d 162 (Utah 1967) 
Finally, the Commission's continuing jurisdiction is subject to the following 
restrictions in subsection 78(4): 
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the 
statutes of limitations contained in other sections of this chapter or 
Chapter 2. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation 
referred to in Subsection (4)(a). 
The Commission understands and respects the various limitations on its continuing 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, when an injured worker asks the Commission to exercise its 
continuing jurisdiction in a case that meets the foregoing conditions, the Commission has 
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the duty to adjudicate the injured worker's case. Buxton v. Industrial Commission. 587 
P.2dl21, 123 (Utah 1978). 
With respect to Mr. Burgess' cases, the Commission has made the 
preliminary determination that Mr. Burgess has filed timely applications for hearing so 
as to allow the Commission to exercise continuing jurisdiction if, in the future, Mr. 
Burgess meets all the other conditions discussed above. Specifically, Mr. Burgess will 
be required to 1) prove a substantial change of condition; 2) prove legal and medical 
causation; and 3) comply with the Act's substantive restrictions on amounts and duration 
of payment. 
POINT THREE: THE COMMISSION HAS APPLIED THE P \T 
MEANING OF §98(2) TO BURGESS7 CASES. 
The preceding section of this brief identifies the several restrictions to the 
Commission's continuing jurisdiction. The WCF argues that the Commission violated 
the last of those restrictions, which prohibits the Commission from exercising continuing 
jurisdiction unless the worker has filed an application as required by §98(2)'s statute of 
limitations. In fact, Mr. Burgess did comply with the plain, unambiguous requirement of 
§98(2). Consequently, the WCF's objection to the Commission's continuing jurisdiction 
is without foundation. 
As noted in Point One of this brief, Mr. Burgess suffered his first accident at 
Siaperas Sand & Gravel on July 1, 1990. He filed an application for hearing regarding 
that accident on March 25, 1996. Mr. Burgess then suffered a second work-related 
accident at JWR, Inc. on August 18, 1994. He filed an application for hearing on that 
accident on March 25, ,996. Obviously, with re5pec. to both accidents, he has complied 
with §98(2)'s six year statute of limitations. 
Bu, now, the WCF asks the Court
 t 0 imply i n t 0 § 9 8 ( 2 ) a n d § ? g a„ ^ _ 
res.ric.ion on Mr. Burgess- ability .0 c,aim future disabiiity compensation. Specific^ 
the WCF argues .ha.
 §98(2) no. only reouires injured workers to fiIe a n a p p I i c a t i o n ^ 
six years from date of accident, bu. also limits the Commission's ability to e ^ its 
continuing jurisdiction to a period of s,x years after the accident. This "six year 
res.ric.ion" ,0 the Commission', exercise of its continuing jurisdiction cannot be found 
in the black letter of either §98(2) or §78, or even by ex.rapoia.ion between these two 
provisions. 
When the language of a statute is clear, as it is in this case, the statute must be 
applied as written. In PJCsafevqjtah State i w ^ n , P ,
 9 2 9 P 2 d , m ( U f a h 
App. 1996), cited in the WCF's own brief, this Court stated: "We begin by examining the 
statute's plain language and resort to other methods of statutory intetpretation only if the 
language of the statute is ambiguous..." 
Despite having cited U^eefe, which notes that statutes plain in their meaning 
should be applied as written, the WCF nevertheless urges the Court to violate that very 
principle by inserting into §98(2) and §78 a fanciful "six year restriction" on the 
Commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction, when no such restriction exists in the 
plain language of the Act. Because there is no ambiguity in the statutes, the Court should 
affirm the Commission's literal application of §98(2) and §78 to Mr. Bur-ess' claim. 
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As noted above, the requirements of §98(2) and §78 are unambiguous. But even 
if the two statutes were viewed as uncertain in their meaning, their context within the Act 
would support the manner of their application by the Commission. 
For example, subsection (2) of §78 provides that "(Records pertaining to cases that 
have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of total permanent 
disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-98, may be 
destroyed at the discretion of the commission." (Emphasis added) 
If the Legislature had intended that the Commission could only exercise continuing 
jurisdiction for six years after a worker's industrial injury, it would be unnecessary for the 
Legislature to direct the Commission to retain records in "cases of total permanent 
disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-98." This statutory 
provision recognizes that the Commission must retain the specified records because the 
Commission's continuing jurisdiction over such cases extends for an indefinite period of 
time. 
Other principles of statutory interpretation also argue against the WCF's suggested 
"6 year restriction" to the Commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction. Utah's 
appellate courts have ruled consistently that the Act should be liberally construed.-4n 
State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to protect employees 
who sustain injuries arising out of their employment by affording financial 
security during the resulting period of disability. To give effect to that 
purpose, the Act should be liberally construed and applied to provide 
11 
coverage. Any doubt respecting the right of compensation will be resolved 
in favor of the injured employee. (Citations omitted.) 
The WCF's argument that the Commission can exercise continuing jurisdiction for 
only six years after a worker's accident would strip workers' compensation coverage from 
a substantial number of injured workers who have filed timely applications for hearing 
and met all other conditions of continuing jurisdiction. The WCF's argument therefore 
runs counter to the principle of "liberal construction in favor of the injured employee" 
discussed in State Tax Commission and a host of Utah appellate decisions through the 
years.3 
In summary §98(2) and §78 are plain, simple and straightforward. Mr. Burgess 
complied with the requirement of §98(2) by filing applications for hearing within six 
years of his accidents. He may, therefore, invoke the Commission's continuing 
jurisdiction under §78 in the event he experiences a substantial change in condition. 
3 
Chandler v. Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919): "The workmen's 
compensation statute should be liberally construed in favor of an injured workman and .. .any 
doubt respecting right to compensation . . . resolved in favor of dependents." 
Park Citv Consol. Mines, v. Industrial Comm'n. 36 P.2d 979 (Utah 1934): "The 
Workmen's Compensation Act is a beneficent law, passed to protect employees . . . . " 
Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm'n. 132 P.2d 376 (Utah 1942): "The workmen's 
compensation statute must be interpreted not only from the judicial, but also from the social point 
of view, so as to give material justice its due .. .." 
Askren v. Industrial Comm'n. 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964) (overruled on other grounds), 
Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n. 675 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983): "The Workmen's 
Compensation Act should be liberally applied in favor of coverage of the employee." 
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POLNT FOUR: THE COMMISSIONS DECISION ON MR 
BURGESS' CLAIMS IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE DECISION L\ 
U.S. SMELTING v. NIELSEN. 
The WCF cites the Utah Supreme Court's decision in U.S. Smelting Refining and 
Mining v. Nielsen, 430 P.2d 162 (Utah 1967) as "clear precedent in resolving the issue 
of whether Section 78 or a specific statute of limitations should prevails. . . ." (See 
Petitioner's initial brief p. 19.) The foregoing quotation from the WCF's brief is an 
indication that the WCF misunderstands the Commission's decision on Mr. Burgess' 
case, and therefore misapprehends the issue before this Court. 
The issue in this case is not whether §78 "prevails" over the statute of limitations 
in §98(2). In its decision, the Commission specifically noted that Mr. Burgess had 
already complied with §98(2).4 Consequently the only basis for the WCF's appeal is its 
argument that the Court should imply a six year restriction on the Commission's exercise 
of its continuing jurisdiction. The WCF relies on the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in 
U.S. Smelting. However, U.S. Smelting does not support the WCF's argument. 
The facts underlying U.S. Smelting are as follows: Nielsen, an employee of U.S. 
Smelting, suffered a work-related knee injury in 1952. He received permanent partial 
disability compensation for his injury pursuant to §66 of the Act.5 But while §66 
4
 Commission's Order On Motion For Review, page three. (Appendix 2, attached.) 
5 
Until recodification on July 1, 1997, the Act's provisions fo: permanent partial disability 
compensation remained at §66. They are now located at §34A-2-412. 
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authorized payment of permanent partial disability compensation, it also contained 
restrictions to the amount and duration of such compensation, as follows: 
Where the injury causes partial disability for work, the employee 
shall receive, during such disability and for a period not to exceed six yenrs 
from the date of the injury, a weekly compensation 
In case the partial disability begins after a period of total disability, 
the period of total disability shall be deducted from the total period of 
compensation. . . . 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the 
limitations as to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this 
section, and in no event shall more than a total of $6,250.00 be required to 
be paid. (Emphasis added.) 
In 1965, 13 years after his original injury, Nielsen sought to reopen his claim and 
obtain additional permanent partial disability compensation on account of further 
impairment related to his knee injury. 
The primary focus of the Court's decision was whether §66's six-year cap on the 
duration of permanent partial disability compensation began to run on the date the 
accident occurred, or the date the injury was discovered. The Court concluded that the 
six year cap commenced with the date of accident. The Court also addressed the extent 
of the Commission's continuing jurisdiction with respect to Nielsen's claim and 
concluded that such continuing jurisdiction could not override the Act's substantive 
restrictions on benefits, such as §66's limit on the duration of permanent partial disability 
compensation. 
Of course, the Commission is bound by the decision in U.S. Smelting. Therefore, 
in the event Mr. Burgess invokes the Commission's continuing jurisdiction in the future, 
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the Commission will be obliged to apply the Act's substantive restrictions to Mr. 
Burgess' claim. 
For example, in 1990 and 1994, the years in which Mr. Burgess' accidents 
occurred, §35-1-65 of the Act imposed the following substantive restrictions on the 
amount and duration of temporary total disability compensation: 
. . . In no case shall such compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks at the 
rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury over 
a period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
Thus, in exercising continuing jurisdiction over Mr. Burgess' claims arising from his 
1990 and 1994 accidents, the Commission will be unable to award temporary total 
compensation beyond the restrictions set forth in §65, above. Likewise, the Commission 
will be obliged to comply with any of the Act's similar substantive restrictions that are 
applicable to Mr. Burgess' case. 
It must be remember that at this point, the Commission has only determined that 
Mr. Burgess filed timely applications for hearing. Before Mr. Burgess can actually 
prevail on any future claims for workers' compensation benefits, he still must establish 
a substantial change of condition, prove legal and medical causation, and meet all the 
Act's substantive restrictions. These requirements are entirely consistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision U.S. Smelting. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's decision on Mr. Burgess' case correctly applies the provisions 
of §78, regarding the Commission's continuing jurisdiction, and §98(2), the Act's statute 
15 
of limitations. The Commission respectfully requests this Court to uphold the 
Commission's determination that Mr. Burgess may invoke the Commission's 
continuing jurisdiction over his case, upon a showing of substantial change of his 
condition. 
Dated this 30lh day of January, 1998. 
AU-U^-UA 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Utah Labor Commission 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 96283 and 96284 
ROLLAND BURGESS, 
Applicant/Petitioner, 
vs 
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL 
/WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH AND JWR CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY/WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH, 
Respondents, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER 
ON MOTION 
TO AMEND 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 
28, 1996 at 3:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant/petitioner was represented by Hans 
Scheffler, Attorney. 
The respondent, Siaperas Sand & Gravel/Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, was represented by 
Barbara Sharp, Attorney. 
The respondent, JWR Construction/Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, was represented by 
Richard Sumsion, Attorney. 
On March 25, 1996, the applicant/petitioner filed two 
applications for hearing with the Industrial Commission, one with 
respect to a July 1, 1990 industrial accident and one with respect 
to an August 18, 1994 industrial accident. The 
applicant/petitioner indicated on the applications for hearing that 
he was claiming (in relevant part) medical expenses (accrued), 
recommended medical care (i.e. future medical expenses), temporary 
tc.al compensation (TTC) and permanent impairment benefits (PPI) in 
connection with both accidents. The matter was set for hearing, 
but at the time of the hearing, or shortly thereafter, the TTC and 
PPI claims were settled and a compensation agreement was approved 
by the ALJ post-hearing, on October 28, 199 6, documenting that 
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settlement. At hearing, the attorneys indicated that they wanted 
to discuss the claim for medical expenses, both past and future, 
and how the statue of limitations should apply to those expenses. 
This was done and at the conclusion of the hearing (treated 
essentially as an attorneys conference although the 
applicant/petitioner was available to testify) the claim for 
medical expenses was also settled. The discussions regarding the 
medical expense claim, and the resolution achieved with respect to 
that claim, is documented in a post-hearing letter that the ALJ 
sent to the parties (dated September 5, 1996). 
At the conclusion of the hearing on August 28, 1996, counsel 
for the applicant/petitioner submitted two motions with respect to 
amendment of the application for hearing. Because those motions 
were being submitted for the first time at the hearing, the ALJ 
allowed the respondents 3 0 days in which to respond in writing to 
those motions. The response was received at the Commission on 
September 27, 1996, and the matter was considered ready for an 
order on the motions at that time. 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED: 
The first motion submitted by the applicant/petitioner is 
a Motion to Amend the applications for hearing to include claims 
for future TTC, PPI and permanent total disability benefits (PTD). 
The motion indicates that this request/motion was being made 
pursuant to two Court of Appeals cases, Avis v. Board of Review, 
837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992), and Middlestadt v. Industrial 
Commission, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993). The 
applicant/petitioner suggests in his motion that these cases allow, 
and may require, the filing of applications for hearing prior Jto 
when an applicant/petitioner's claim is ready to be adjudicated. 
The second motion submitted by the applicant/petitioner 
indicates that the applicant/petitioner admits that the claims for 
future benefits are not ready to be adjudicated at this time and 
thus the motion seeks to have the amended application for hearing 
continued without date (apparently meaning held in abeyance by the 
Commission until such time as they are ready for adjudication). 
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The respondents have filed a joint response to the motions 
filed by the applicant/petitioner. The respondents argue that it 
is inappropriate to hold cases in abeyance, where there is no way 
of knowing when and if they will be ripe for adjudication and that 
the failure to prosecute these claims necessitates a dismissal of 
the claims. The respondents argue that the applicant/petitioner 
cannot enlarge the statue of limitations by having a case continued 
without date and asserts that the 6-year statute of limitations 
currently specified in U.C.A. 35-1-98 applies to bar any further 
claims on the applicant/petitioner's 1990 injury. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ understands how the Avis and Middlestadt cases have 
been interpreted by many to allow a tolling of at least some of the 
statutes of limitation found in the workers compensation laws. 
However, the ALJ has to admit that she simply does not understand 
what the court anticipated by those rulings. As is the case in 
much of the case law, Commission rules and even in the statute, the 
phrase "filing a claim" is used loosely without an indication 
regarding whether this means filing a claim for benefits with the 
carrier or filing an application for hearing with the Commission. 
The court in both Avis and Middlestadt refers to "filing for an 
increase," "filing for benefits, "file a compensation claim" but 
never indicates with whom these claims are to be filed and never 
refers to filing an application for hearing, which is the means of 
invoking Commission jurisdiction. Therefore, the ALJ cannot say 
that those cases reflect that filing an application for hearing, or 
amending an application for hearing with the Commission, is 
sufficient for tolling any certain filing limitation. In addition, 
both cases deal with laws different from the statue of limitations 
currently stated in U.C.A. 35-1-98 and thus it is uncertain if they 
apply to that statute. In short, the ALJ cannot say that allowing 
or disallowing the requested amendment in this case will have any 
effect whatsoever on the applicant/petitioner's ability to make 
future claims with respect to his 1990 or 1994 accident. 
Not withstanding the discussion above, the ALJ understands 
that some have interpreted the Avis and Middlestadt cases to 
require the filing of an application for hearing for certain 
benefits, before there is evidence of entitlement to those 
benefits, in order to prevent the statute of limitations from 
running. The ALJ understands that some attorneys even feel that it 
may be malpractice to fail to simply make the filing, just in case 
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it might toll the statute of limitations. Because the ALJ finds 
that the law is very unclear in this area at this time, the ALJ 
feels that she should allow the amendment to the claim, even though 
the effect of allowing the same is not settled. The application 
for hearing is therefore deemed amended to include a claim for 
future TTC, PPI and PTD. However, the ALJ is disinclined to 
continue the matter without date. The applicant/petitioner 
concedes there is currently no supportive evidence for these 
potential future claims and it is the Commission practice, or at 
least the practice of this ALJ to dismiss, without prejudice, 
applications for hearing that are not ready to be adjudicated. 
Therefore, the applicant/petitioner's amended application for 
hearing, claiming future TTC, PPI and PTD, is dismissed without 
prejudice. 
Once again, the ALJ must indicate that she takes no position 
on what effect, if any, the requested amendments have on the 
applicant/petitioner's right to claim future benefits related to 
his 1990 and 1994 injuries. His right to future benefits will be 
determined at the time that he makes those claims and they are 
ready to be adjudicated. The ALJ also takes no position on what 
statute of limitations applies to the 1990 and 1994 accidents as 
this area of the law remains unsettled in the appellate courts. 
The legislature continually amends the workers compensation laws 
without indicating whether or not the amendment is intended to be 
retroactive or not, leaving the retroactivity question related to 
each new amendment to be litigated. In addition, the statute of 
limitations may be different depending on the type of claim that 
the applicant/petitioner may make in the future. Considering the 
enormous questions involved with respect to what statute of 
limitations may apply to any future claim, the ALJ finds it best to 
leave this question open until such time as there is a concrete 
claim to be decided. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant/petitioner's 
MOTION TO AMEND APPLICATION FOR HEARING AND JOIN THE EMPLOYERS 
REINSURANCE FUND is granted and the applicant/petitioner's MOTION 
TO CONTINUE WITHOUT DATE THE APPLICANT'S CLAIM FOR ADDITIONAL 
BENEFITS is denied. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amended claim is dismissed 
without prejudice as there is no justiciable issue at this time. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Commission within 
thirty (3 0) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the 
particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the 
Commission within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order 
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. If a Motion 
for Review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days of 
the date hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed 
within fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion 
for Review by the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-
46b-12. 
DATED this 22nd day of November, 1996, 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ROLLAND BURGESS, * 
* ORDER ON MOTIONS 
Applicant, * FOR REVIEW 
V-
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL , 
JWR CONSTRUCTION CO. and 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Each party in the above-entitled proceeding asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to 
review the Administrative Law Judge's decision regarding Rolland Burgess' claim for benefits 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over these motion for review pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
May Mr. Burgess amend his applications for workers' compensation benefits to include 
possible future medical expenses and disability compensation? If Mr. Burgess is permitted to so 
amend his applications, are the applications subject to dismissal on the grounds they fail to raise a 
presently justiciable issue? 
BACKGROUND 
Mr. Burgess was injured in two separate work accidents, the first on July I, 1990 while 
employed by Siaperas Sand & Gravel, the second on August 18, 1994 while employed by JWR 
Construction. On March 25, 1996, Mr. Burgess filed two applications seeking workers' 
compensation benefits for his injuries from the two accidents. 
Prior to the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Burgess' claims, the two employers and their 
workers' compensation insurance carrier, The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, accepted 
liability for Mr. Burgess' medical expenses and disability compensation with respect to his then-
existing condition. On August 28, 1996, Mr. Burgess moved to amend his applications for hearing 
to include a claim for future benefits that might arise as a result of his work injuries. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation referred 
to in Subsection (3)(a) in any respect. 
It is therefore necessary to examine the specific language of the statute of limitations 
applicable to claims for workers' compensation disability. That statute of limitations is found in 
§35-1-98 of the Act: 
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary 
partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total 
disability benefits is barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the 
commission within six years after the date of the accident. (Emphasis added.) 
Under the foregoing statute, the limitation period is tolled if an application for hearing is 
filed within six years after the date of the accident. In this case, Mr. Burgess has filed an application 
for hearing within the applicable six year period. Furthermore, by agreement of the parties, he 
already has been determined eligible for some benefits under the workers' compensation system. 
Consequently, by virtue of the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction and the plain 
language of §35-1-98(2), the Industrial Commission may exercise continuing jurisdiction over Mr. 
Burgess' claim if he proves that a significant change has occurred in his condition. 
In light of the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction in this case, it is unnecessary 
to hold Mr. Burgess' applications for hearing open. Instead, Mr. Burgess may request that the 
Industrial Commission reopen the matter if future developments warrant such a request.2 
In reaching the foregoing conclusion, the Industrial Commission has carefully considered 
the Utah Court of Appeals' decisions in Avis v. Bd. of Review. 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992) and 
Middlestad v. Industrial Commission. 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993). However, in neither case 
did the court consider the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction under §35-1-78(1) of the 
Act.3 The Industrial Commission also notes the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Stoker v. The 
Workers' Compensation Fund, 889 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1994), in which the Court suggests the 
Industrial Commission retains continuing jurisdiction in cases such as this. 
In summary, the Industrial Commission concludes that because the issue raised in WCF's 
motion for review is moot, no purpose is served by considering the matter further. The Industrial 
2
 Of course, at such time, Mr. Burgess will be required to "overcome the substantial issues of 
causation" that may then exist. Stoker v. Industrial Commission. 889 P.2d 409,412 (Utah 199^). 
3
 The Industrial Commission notes that the parties neither raised nor briefed the issue of the 
Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction in either Avis or Middlestadt. 
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Commission flirther concludes that, in light of the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction 
to consider Mr. Burgess' right to additional benefits when and if such riehts accrue the*re is no need 
to hold Mr. Burgess' current applications open. Consequently, the ALJ properly dismissed such 
applications. 
ORDER 
A • u\^i g nU n d S S t " t e ? w ^ : ^ I n d U S t r l a l C o m m i s s i o n *ffi™s ^ decision of the ALJ and denies both Mr. Burgess and WCF s motions for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this ^ffiday of June, 1997. 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Chairman 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
^ &*? 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPFAT, RTftWTg 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request 
for reconsideration must be received by the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this 
order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by film* a 
petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 
30 days of the date of this order. 
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